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Income Pooling and Household Division of Labor: 
Evidence from Danish Couples
* 
 
If income pooling indicates primary earners’ willingness to trade part of their income with 
spouses who earn less and work more in household production, then among specialized 
couples income pooling will be positively associated with the price of commercial domestic 
services, substitutes for household production. In line with our prediction, analyses of data 
from a unique Danish household survey show that complete income pooling is more frequent 





We find that the higher the wage of unskilled female workers in the region of residence – our 
proxy for the price of commercial domestic services – the more couples are likely to 
completely share their income. This finding is limited to specialized couples along traditional 
gender lines. Our finding suggests that where women perform home production in excess of 
what their husbands (or partners) do, they get compensated for this extra work in the form of 
access to extra income earned by their husbands. 
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I.    Introduction 
Most of the economic literature on consumption and savings views households as merged 
decision-making units with shared preferences and pooled incomes.  Among those who have 
challenged this simplistic view of the household on  conceptual  grounds and recognized that 
individual household members may differ in their preferences are Samuelson (1956), McElroy 
and Horney (1981), Grossbard (1984), Apps and Rees (1988, 1997), Chiappori (1992), Lundberg 
and Pollak (1993), Browning et al (1994), and Chen and Woolley (2001).  In addition, a number 
of empirical studies have shown that the earner‟s identity affects consumption decisions (e.g. 
Thomas 1990, Browning et al 1994, Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997, Phipps and Burton 1998, 
Lee 2007), suggesting that couples fail to completely pool their incomes.  Furthermore, it has 
been  documented  that  individuals  living  together  in  unmarried  cohabitation  (for  short, 
cohabitation)  or  marriage  often  keep  separate  bank  accounts  in  the  U.S.  (Treas  1993  and 
Klawitter 2008) and Canada (Woolley 2003).  Using the Danish Household Survey of 1999-
2005, which specifically asks respondents whether they pool their incomes, Bonke and Uldall-
Poulsen (2007; hence BU) find that complete income pooling is far from universal.  In yet other 
countries, financial independence in marriage is commanded by law.  In that regard, Korean law 
requires that married Koreans hold separate savings accounts (Lee and Pocock 2007).   
Explanations of financial pooling by couples have focused on the existence of public 
goods
2 or on bargaining over financial control  based on the resources owned by each partner.
3  
Less attention has been paid to  specialization in household production as an explanation for 
                                                 
2 For instance, it has been shown that couples are less likely to have separate accounts (Treas 1993, Klawitter 2008) 
if they have more children, which are considered as household public goods (defined by Lam 1988).  Likewise, BU 
showed that couples with children are more likely to pool their incomes.   
3 In line with household bargaining theories ( e.g.  McElroy and Horney (1981) or Lundberg and Pollak (1993)), 
Treas (1993), Chen and Woolley (2001) and other sociological research surveyed by Klawitter (2008) report that 
women more active in the labor force are more likely to have their own bank accounts.  Similarly, Lee and Pocock 
(2007) show that the higher wives‟ relative earnings are in Korea, the more they are likely to have savings on their 
name.   3 
 
income pooling.  Exceptions are Dobbelsteen and Kooreman (1997) and BU, who recognize that 
the incentive for income pooling can derive from the perceived gains from specialization.  We 
add to the existing literature by modeling and empirically testing whether income pooling serves 
as a form of intra-household compensation by the couple‟s principal earner to the couple‟s likely 
main supplier of household work.     
Like  the  afore-mentioned  literature,  we  assume  that  income  pooling  depends  on  the 
existence  of  public  goods  and  that  partners  bargain  over  financial  control.    However,  our 
approach differs in that we assume that bargaining over who controls the finances is a function 
not only of the resources that each individual owns, but also of the division of labor among the 
two partners.  Specifically, we posit that income pooling is partially a form of compensation to 
the spouse likely specializing in household production.  We view such an exchange of work for 
money within the household as reminiscent of an exchange of work for a wage in the labor 
market in more than one way.  Competitive markets help establish equilibrium terms of trade for 
work in household production in a manner similar to how labor supply and demand determine 
equilibrium wages in labor market. Those terms of trade influence intra-household specialization 
and the likelihood of income pooling.   
We analyze data from a Danish survey on income pooling, a unique component of the 
1999-2005  Danish  Household  Survey  that  has  been  previously  analyzed  by  BU  (2007)  and 
Bonke and Browning (2010).  We offer empirical evidence that supports our interpretation of 
income pooling possibly serving as compensation from primary earners to secondary earners in 
exchange for their presumably greater specialization in household work.  Specifically, we find 
that an increase in the wages of unskilled female workers –our proxy for the price of commercial 
domestic services, which can be considered a substitute for  home production by one of the 4 
 
partners– raises the likelihood of income pooling among couples with traditional specialization 
following gender lines.  However, it has no effect on the likelihood of income pooling among 
other couples.  This is consistent with our view of income pooling as a channel that facilitates 
compensation  by  one  spouse  for  the  work  performed  by  the  other  spouse  in  household 
production.   
II.    Conceptual Framework  
Our goal is to gain a better understanding of why some couples pool their incomes and 
others do not.  We assume that individuals remain independent decision-making agents after 
entering marriage or cohabitation, implying that they each have their own monetary disposable 
personal income.  Disposable Personal Income (DPI) is defined as:  
(1)   i i i DPI MI T  ,  
that is, the sum of own monetary income (MI) and an intra-household transfer T paid to partner i 
by partner j.
4  In the case where partners have equal incomes, T = 0, i.e. income pooling does not 
involve transfers from a primary to a secondary earner.  However, if the spouses‟ incomes differ, 
income pooling involves a transfer from the primary earner (T < 0) to the secondary earner (T > 
0).  We further assume that transfers are a function of the housework performed by the secondary 
earner.   
We distinguish between specialized and non-specialized households.  For the purpose of 
this conceptual framework, specialized households are households where one partner is more 
active in labor market production and also earns more than the other.
5  In specialized households, 
                                                 
4 We use the terms „partner‟ and „spouse‟ interchangeably, as for most of our discussion it does not matter if partners 
are married or cohabit.   
5 A more precise definition of what specialized couples look like in the empirical analysis is provided in the Data 
section. 5 
 
T is a function of hours of housework and the value of an hour of household work and is given 
by:  
(2)  T = hy,  
where h stands for hours of work spent in household production by the secondary earner.  This 
includes chores such as meal preparation, laundry, and home cleaning.  In turn, y is the hourly 
compensation agreed upon by the spouses implicitly or explicitly.  This “wage” y is likely to be 
influenced  by  equilibrium conditions  in  local  marriage  markets.
6  Income pooling is then a 
function of how much housework h the secondary earner actually performs and of how much y 
the primary earner actually pays per hour of the spouse‟s household work.   
Our main objective is to determine whether specialized couples pool their incomes as a 
form of compensation for the household work performed by secondary earners.  To that end, we 
examine whether such compensation rises when the cost of a close substitute for household 
production by a partner, as is the case with commercial domestic services, goes up.   The higher 
the value of the price of domestic services in a couple‟s area of residence, the lower the demand 
for commercial domestic services by the primary earner and the higher the demand for household 
work  performed  by  the  secondary  earner  in  specialized  couples  (h).    Increased  demand  for 
household production by a partner will, in turn, raise T by raising h and/or its value, y:
7 
 (3)   T = h(X)*y(X).  
                                                 
6 It is reminiscent of the concept of „quasi-wage‟ in Grossbard-Shechtman (1993). 
7 If the price of domestic services in a couple‟s area of residence increases, the aggregate demand for secondary 
earners‟ h will increase.  If only the demand shifts, it will result in higher compensation for secondary earners 
performing domestic work in marriage and a larger equilibrium level of h as well.  If the aggregate supply of h also 
shifts to the left in response to the higher y, h will significantly rise, while y might not.  Either way, hy will increase 
and so should transfers serving as a compensation for household production.    
 6 
 
Operationally, we approximate the wages of commercial domestic workers by the wages 
of  low-skilled  female  workers  in  the  labor  force.
8  Additionally, because in Denmark more 
household chores are performed by wives, female partners, and female domestic workers than by 
husbands and male partners (Bonke  et  al.,  2008),  specialization  in  household  work  follows 
traditional gender lines.
9  Therefore, our testable hypothesis is that  higher wages of low-skilled 
female workers –a proxy for higher costs of domestic services– are likely to raise the likelihood 
of income pooling among couples with a specialization following traditional gender lines.  The 
price of domestic services should not affect the likelihood of income pooling in non-specialized 
couples and its impact should be minimal among couples with specialization involving a reversal 
of gender roles, i.e. couples where men are secondary earners and they work more at household 
chores than their wives or partners.  
III.    Data  
We use data from two sources: the Danish Household Expenditure Survey (HES) and 
register data.  The HES is an ongoing survey of household buying habits covering heterosexual 
couples, married or not.  The survey consists of a self-administered accounting book („diary‟) 
and a questionnaire („interview‟).  A supplement administered in the period 1999-2005 asks 
respondents about their relationships and backgrounds, such as the length of time the respondents 
have been living together and how they manage their finances.
10   
The register data come from administrative registers and include information on age, 
income, education, labor market status, civil status, number and age of children, and wages of all 
                                                 
8 Domestic workers are primarily low-skilled women. 
9 Men are primary earners and women secondary earners.   
10 For further details on the data set, see Bonke & Browning (2010).   7 
 
household members.
11  As a proxy for the cost of commercial domestic services we use register 
data on wages of unskilled females working in the private sector in four different  residential 
areas of Denmark, adjusting for inflation during the six survey years.  
In the HES, individuals were asked to indicate the best way to describe their method of 
organizing their finances.  Most households report some form of income pooling, and the  vast 
majority of these households report complete „income pooling‟.
12  In the following analysis, only 
those households stating that they pool all their resources (68 percent of all households) are 
termed „income pooling‟ households.  Because we are interested in examining whether income 
pooling is a compensation for household work between primary and secondary earners, we focus 
our attention on men and women between the ages of 25 and 59.  These are ages likely to involve 
more household production and labor market participation.   
We want to compare couples following traditional specialization along gender lines vs. 
couples who either do not specialize or do not specialize following traditional gender lines.  In 
defining  specialized  couples  along  traditional  gender  lines  we  consider  two  criteria  for 
specialization: (1) wife (or female partner) earns less than 50 percent of the couple‟s earnings, 
i.e. the wife is the secondary earner; and (2) the wife works less in the labor force than the 
husband.  We refer to the first criterion as the earnings criterion and to the second criterion as 
the employment criterion of specialization.  The employment criterion is met if: (a) the husband 
is in the labor force and the wife is not, or (b) the husband is employed in the private sector and 
the wife is employed in the public sector.  The assumption behind this employment criterion is 
                                                 
11 If not currently employed, the last yearly wages are used.    
12 Complete income pooling involves choice of the follow ing answer: „”All money is shared: we don‟t distinguish 
between „my‟ or „your‟ money.” Alternative answers were: “Some money is regarded as „my‟ and some as „our‟ 
money”; “What we earn individually belongs to each of us”; “The husband administers the money, and the wife 
receives an allowance when she is in need of cash”; “The wife administers the money, and the husband receives an 
allowance when he is in need of cash”; “The husband administers some of the housekeeping money and the wife 
administers the rest”; “The wife administers some of the housekeeping money and the husband administers the rest” 
and “Some other arrangement.” 8 
 
that  partners  who  are  less  involved  in  the  labor  force  market  perform  a  greater  share  of 
household production.  If both work, we look at whether they hold jobs in the private sector or 
the public sector.  In Denmark, relative to jobs in the private sector, public sector jobs typically 
offer more flexibility and fewer hours of work.  Therefore, public sector jobs are often preferred 
by individuals with a heavier household production load.   
A total of 482 couples of the 1472 couples included in the analysis can be considered 
specialized according to both criteria.  To assess whether both the earnings and employment 
criteria  of  specialization  need  to  be  present  in  order  for  income  pooling,  we  also  define 
specialized couples using the earnings and the employment criteria separately.  A total of 1089 
couples of the 1472 couples included in the analysis can be considered specialized according to 
the earnings criterion alone and a total of 588 couples can be considered specialized according 
to the employment criterion. 
Basic summary statistics for  our samples of study are  found in Table  1.  Column 1 
presents  statistics  for  the  couples  specialized  along  traditional  gender  lines  following  both 
criteria of specialization.  Column 2 includes all other couples in our sample and serves as our 
control group.  Column 3 includes couples in which the wife earns less than 50 percent of the 
couple‟s earnings (earnings criterion of specialization).  Finally, column 4 includes couples who 
are specialized only according to the employment criterion.  It can be noted that the likelihood of 
income pooling does not vary much across the four types of gender specialization.  That is not 
surprising.  After all, the price of domestic services is expected to increase the likelihood of 
income pooling among couples specialized along traditional gender lines, whereas other factors, 
such  as  preference  for  an  egalitarian  distribution  of  household  income,  may  increase  the 
likelihood of income pooling among non-specialized couples.   9 
 
IV.  Methodology  
Our goal is to gain a better understanding of why some couples pool their incomes and 
others do not.  Our main hypothesis is that income pooling is a form of compensation from 
primary  earners  to  secondary  earners,  especially  if  couples  are  specialized  along  traditional 
gender lines according to the earnings and employment criteria.  Because we lack data on the 
amount of home production by each of the partners (h in our model) and on the value of such 
work (y in our model), we assess whether the price of a substitute for home production, as is the 
case  with  wages  of  unskilled  female  workers,  is  positively  linked  to  a  higher likelihood  of 
income  pooling  among  specialized  households.
13  To test our  prediction,  we estimate the 
following logit model:
14  
(1)  ) 0 ( I *
* ' *       i i i
services domestic
r i IP X P IP      
where:
*
i IP is the unobserved or latent likelihood of income pooling by the  ith  couple.    The 
function  ) 0 ( I
*  i IP is  an  indicator  function  taking  on  the  value  “one”  if  0
*  i IP   and  “zero” 
otherwise.  The variable 
services domestic
r P captures the average wages of unskilled female workers in 
the region r where the ith couple resides.  Our hypothesis is that β1>0 and statistically different 
from zero among specialized couples since its impact is conditional on the existence of some 
specialization in housework; but not among their counterparts who are not specialized along 
traditional gender lines.   
The vector  i X  includes a variety of demographic and economic controls, such as age, 
the  educational  attainment  of  both  partners  and  information  on  the  household‟s  non-labor 
                                                 
13 The opposite does not follow. The presence of complete income pooling does not necessarily reflect transfers 
from male principal earners to female partners doing more of the household work. Income pooling can also reflect 
feelings of love or egalitarian beliefs.  
14 Results were similar using a probit or linear model specification. 10 
 
income.    We  also  account  for  significant  age  difference  between  partners,  the  number  of 
previous partners in the case of men, and for whether the mothers from both partners worked 
when  they  were  growing  up  as  potentially  important  factors  driving  the  likelihood  of 
specialization along traditional gender lines and, therefore, the probability of income pooling by 
couples.  Likewise, children –one kind of household public goods (Lam 1988), are included 
since  we  expect  couples  to  be  more  likely  to  pool  their  incomes  in  the  presence  of  more 
household public goods (Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen 2007).
15  We also account for children from 
previous relationships.  We estimated our regressions with and without controls for survey year 
and found that this did not make any difference.       
V.      Findings  
Table 2 displays the results from estimating equation (1) as a logit model for various 
samples  of  couples.    It  appears  from  Table  2  that, as  predicted,  our  proxy  for  the  price  of 
domestic services raises the likelihood of income pooling significantly more among specialized 
couples (col. 1) in which women earn less and work less in the labor force than among the rest of 
the sample (col. 2).
16  In particular, a doubling of the price of domestic services would raise the 
likelihood of income pooling among specialized couples by approximately 19 percentage points.  
These results suggest that, as the price of domestic services goes up, the “earnings” of secondary 
earners from performing household chores, yh, increase.  However, also as hypothesized earlier 
on, that price has no impact on income pooling in the rest of the sample.  That the price of 
domestic services –proxied by wages of low-skill women– has no bearing on the likelihood of 
income  pooling  among  non-specialized  couples  makes  sense  too,  for  among  these  couples 
                                                 
15 In a similar vein, Klawitter (2008) finds that couples with children are more likely to hold joint accounts than 
childless couples. 
16 The difference between the effect of price of domestic services in columns 1 and 2 is statistically different from 
zero at a 5% level according to a Chow test. 11 
 
income  pooling  is  less  likely  to  serve  as  compensation  for  women‟s  work  in  household 
production. 
Worth noting is the fact that our proxy for the price of domestic services is also positively 
linked to a higher likelihood of income pooling among specialized couples in specification (4), 
which only takes into account specialization according to the employment criterion.  A Chow test 
comparing the effects of the price of domestic services in columns 1 and 4 reveals that income 
pooling as a form of compensation for performing a greater share of household work is primarily 
based  on  the  division  of  labor  between  men  and  women  following  traditional gender  roles, 
regardless of their earnings differential.   
Our finding suggests that higher costs of commercial domestic services raise the value of 
women‟s household production and, in turn, their bargaining power in marriage and accessibility 
to her partner‟s income.  Alternatively, access to their partners‟ income may result from better 
employment opportunities proxied by higher wages.  Better market work prospects may raise all 
women‟s  bargaining  power,  regardless  of  whether  they  perform  household  chores  or  not.  
However, if higher wages influence women‟s bargaining power via their labor supply and not via 
their partners‟ demand for greater home production, the price of domestic services should raise 
the likelihood of income pooling among all couples, not just among specialized couples. 
  In addition to the price of commercial domestic services, a variety of demographic and 
economic factors appear to be driving the likelihood of complete income pooling in our sample 
of Danish couples.  For instance, we find that older women are more likely to participate in 
income pooling, which could be a by-product of the longer time they may have been in the 
relationship or the result of more traditional values.  Men are also slightly more likely to support 
their  female  partners  when  women  are  significantly  younger.    This  effect  –captured  by  the 12 
 
coefficient on „age difference‟– is, nevertheless, rather small (statistically significant at times at 
the 10 percent level) and only suggestive of possible compensating differentials in marriage 
whereby men compensate women for their older age by transferring more of their income to 
them (see Grossbard-Shechtman 1993, Woolley 2003).   
Also worth noting is how family obligations do impact the likelihood of income pooling, 
although to varying degrees.  For instance, pre-existing family responsibilities –as captured by 
the  presence  of children  from  the  woman‟s  previous  relationships–  lowers  the likelihood  of 
income pooling among specialized couples anywhere between 14 and 25 percentage points.
17    
Similarly, other pre-existing family responsibilities captured by the number of previous partners 
of the male partner at times lower the  likelihood of income pooling among specialized couples.  
Perhaps, men with a larger number of previous partners are more likely to have pre -existing 
financial obligations that curtail their ability to pool income.  This effect is significantly stronger 
in column (1) than in  column (2), possibly because men‟s prior financial responsibilities are 
more of a constraint if they also provide financial support to a new wife or female partner.  In 
contrast, current family obligations as captured by the presence of joint children in the household 
–a form of a public good– generally raises the likelihood of income pooling, particularly when 
the children are young.     
Finally, Table 2 also informs on the likelihood of income pooling among women whose 
mothers worked when they grew up.  We find that women whose mothers worked in the labor 
market when they  were growing up have less access to their husbands‟ income via income 
pooling.    This  holds  for  specialized  couples,  regardless  of  how  specialization  is  defined.  
Specifically, the likelihood of income pooling in specialized couples drops between 0.09 and 
                                                 
17 Men‟s children from previous relationships have no impact whatsoever on the likelihood of income pooling, 
whether couples are specialized or not (results available upon request). 13 
 
0.14.    This  could  be  related  to  higher  productivity  in  household  labor  among  their  female 
counterparts whose mothers were full time housewives.  Alternatively, traditional values could 
be driving this result. 
VI.      Robustness Checks  
We further explore if our findings vary by marital status and relationship length.  About 
64 percent of our sample of 1472 couples is married, while the rest cohabitates.  Additionally, 
about 51 percent of our sample has lived together for at least 10 years.  Previous research has 
shown that, relative to unmarried couples, married couples appear more likely to completely pool 
their  income  (Bonke  and  Uldall-Poulsen  2007)  and  to  hold  joint  accounts  (Woolley  2003, 
Klawitter 2008).  This holds relative to unmarried couples that are either same-sex or different-
sex (Klawitter 2008).   
Table 3 displays results from carrying out the analysis separately for cohabitating and 
married couples. Table 4 does the same for couples with up to 9 years of being together and 
couples with a relationship lasting over 9 years.  We focus our attention on the effect of changes 
in the price of commercial domestic services, which continues to play a substantial role in the 
likelihood of income pooling among specialized couples.  A doubling of the cost of domestic 
services raises the likelihood of income pooling anywhere between 10 percentage points (Table 
4, column 3, the case of couples in shorter-lived relationships with only a difference in earnings) 
to  28  percentage  points  (Table  3,  column  5,  the  case  of  cohabitating  couples  specialized 
according to both the earnings and the employment criteria).  We also continue to find that the 
price of domestic services affects income pooling significantly more among specialized couples 
in column (1) –particularly via the employment criterion as revealed by the results in column 
(4)– than among non-specialized couples.   14 
 
In sum, after splitting the sample by marital status and relationship length, we continue to 
find that our proxy for the price of domestic services raises the likelihood of income pooling 
among  specialized  couples,  but  not  among  non-specialized  couples.  This  reinforces  our 
interpretation that income pooling may serve as a form of compensation from the male partners 
to their female partners‟ greater specialization in household production.   
VII.     Summary and Conclusions  
This paper examines the determinants of complete income pooling.  We hypothesize that 
income pooling depends on the rate at which primary earners compensate secondary earners for 
this  work.  In  turn,  this  rate  of  compensation  is  expected  to  be  a  function  of  the  price  of 
commercial domestic services and of the degree of traditional household specialization.  As a 
result,  in  our  empirical  analysis  of  income  pooling  reports  by  Danish  couples,  we  contrast 
couples specializing along traditional gender roles (couples with female secondary earners) and 
those  who  do  not.  We  expect  exchanges  of  household  work  for  monetary  transfers  among 
couples specializing along traditional gender lines.  Therefore, we expect the price of female 
domestic  services  to  primarily  affect  income  pooling  among  couples  following  a  traditional 
division of labor. 
Using survey responses on complete income pooling, we find that the higher the wage of 
unskilled female workers in the region of residence  –our proxy for the price of commercial 
domestic services– the more couples are likely to completely share their income.  This finding is 
limited to specialized couples along traditional gender lines.  Our finding suggests that where 
women perform home production in excess of what their husbands (or partners) do, they get 
compensated for this extra work in the form of access to extra income earned by their husbands. 
In  traditional  households,  the  higher  the  costs  of  commercial  domestic  services,  the  higher 15 
 
women‟s value in markets for household work and, in turn, their bargaining power in marriage 
and their access to their husbands‟ earnings via complete income pooling.  In contrast, among 
egalitarian couples or couples following a non-traditional division of labor, the price of domestic 
services has no effect on income pooling.  These are couples where men are not expected to 
compensate women for work in home production.  We had very few couples with reversed 
domestic roles and found no evidence of women compensating men for their extra work in home 
production in such instances.  
We hope that further work will examine the degree to which income pooling varies with 
specialization in household production by using more detailed data on the individual time spent 
in home production while taking account of the endogeneity of their time use patterns with 
respect to the household‟s likelihood of income pooling.  We also hope that our study can be 
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Table 1  
Means and Standard Deviations  
Notes: Variables are defined in Table A. The various specifications refer to the following samples: 
(1)  Couple specialized according to the earnings criterion (wife or female partner) earns less than 50% of the 
couple‟s earnings) and the employment criterion (the husband is in the labor force and the wife is not OR 
the husband is employed in the private sector and the wife in the public sector).   
(2)  All couples not included in specification (1).  
(3)  Specialized according to the earnings criterion only.  
(4)  Specialized couples according to the employment criterion only.  
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Descriptive Statistic  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Income Pooling  0.670  .47  0.692  .46  0.687  .46  0.663  .47 
Non-Labor Income     82.61  163.6  66.90  84.4  78.03  128.9  77.3  151.6 
Woman‟s Age          37.07  10.32  37.890  10.0  37.340  10.1  37.160  10.25 
Age Difference      2.199  3.13  2.315  3.27  2.313  3.25  2.211  3.12 
Log (P of DS)     4.850  .42  4.878  .44  4.865  .43  4.843  .44 
Woman‟s education   12.400  3.31  12.340  3.54  12.300  3.36  12.390  3.42 
Man‟s education  12.060  3.24  12.500  3.47  12.450  3.33  11.890  3.32 
Man‟s Mother Worked        0.463  .50  0.405  .49  0.429  .50  0.457  .50 
Woman‟s Mother Worked   0.442  .50  0.436  .50  0.450  .50  0.434  .50 
Woman‟s Previous Children  0.137  .34  0.139  .35  0.129  .34  0.145  .35 
Man‟s previous partners  0.309  .46  0.320  .47  0.307  .46  0.320  .47 
Any child 0-1  0.064  .25  0.052  .22  0.062  .24  0.065  .25 
Any child 2-15  0.461  .50  0.464  .50  0.469  .50  0.461  .50 
Any child 16-  0.056  .23  0.065  .25  0.066  .25  0.051  .22 
Woman earns less than 50%  0  0  .39  .49  0  0  .18  .38 
Man in LF and Woman Not  .32  .47  .02  .13  .14  .35  .29  .46 
Man Private S Woman Public S  .80  .40  .13  .34  .37  .48  .82  .39 
Married  .62  .49  .65  .48  .64  .48  .62  .49 
Duration   13.2  10.37  13.36  10.16  13.28  10.13  13.08  10.31 
N  482  990  1089  588 19 
 
Table 2 
Marginal Effects from a Logit Model of the Likelihood of Income Pooling (t-statistics)  
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








































































































N  482  990  1089  588 
Notes:  The  figures  reported  are  the  Logit  model  marginal  effects.    The  t-statistics  are  in  parentheses.    The 
regressions include a constant term.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  The various specifications refer to the 
following samples: 
(1)  Couple specialized according to the earnings criterion (wife or female partner) earns less than 50% of the 
couple’s earnings) and the employment criterion (the husband is in the labor force and the wife is not OR the 
husband is employed in the private sector and the wife in the public sector).   
(2)  All couples not included in specification (1).  
(3)  Specialized according to the earnings criterion only.  






Marginal Effects from a Logit Model of the Likelihood of Income Pooling By Marital Status (t-statistics)  
Sub-sample  Married Couples  Cohabitating Couples  
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
















N  299  640  695  364  183  350  394  224 
Notes: The figures reported are the Logit model marginal effects.  The t-statistics are in parentheses.  The regressions include a constant term.  * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  The various specifications refer to the following samples: 
(1)  Couple specialized according to the earnings criterion (wife or female partner) earns less than 50% of the couple’s earnings) and the employment criterion (the 
husband is in the labor force and the wife is not OR the husband is employed in the private sector and the wife in the public sector).   
(2)  All couples not included in specification (1).  
(3)  Specialized according to the earnings criterion only.  




Marginal Effects from a Logit Model of the Likelihood of Income Pooling By Length of Relationship (t-statistics)  
Sub-sample  Together for Less than 10 Years  Together for More than 10 Years or Plus  
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
















N  238  483  532  292  244  507  557  296 
Notes: The figures reported are the Logit model marginal effects.  The t-statistics are in parentheses.  The regressions include a constant term.  * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  The various specifications refer to the following samples: 
(1)  Couple specialized according to the earnings criterion (wife or female partner) earns less than 50% of the couple’s earnings) and the employment criterion (the 
husband is in the labor force and the wife is not OR the husband is employed in the private sector and the wife in the public sector).   
(2)  All couples not included in specification (1).  
(3)  Specialized according to the earnings criterion only.  
(4)  Specialized couples according to the employment criterion only.  22 
 
Table A  
Variables and Definitions 
Variables  Definitions 
Income Pooling  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the couple pools all their income 
Woman‟s Age          Woman‟s age in years 
Age Difference      Husband‟s age minus wife‟s age in years, only if husband is at least three years older than wife. 
Log (P of DS)     Wage-rate for unskilled women in private sector defined for 4 regions and per year. Regions are Greater Copenhagen, 
towns 100,000+ inhabitants, towns 10, - 99,999, and other. 
Man‟s education  Years of educational attainment of the male partner 
Woman‟s education   Years of educational attainment of the female partner 
Any child 0-1  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the couple has any children between the ages of 0 and 1 
Any child 2-15  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the couple has any children between the ages of 2 and 15 
Any child 16-  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the couple has any children over 16 years old 
Woman‟s Previous Children  Woman having a child from a previous partnership living in the present household 
Woman‟s Mother Worked   Dummy variable equal to 1 if the female partner‟s mother worked while she grew up 
Man‟s Mother Worked        Dummy variable equal to 1 if the male partner‟s mother worked while he grew up 
Man‟s previous partners  Man has had one or more previous partners 
Log (non-LI)     Log of the couple‟s non-labor income 
 